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The discursive framing of the ‘war on terror’ was secured through fear of one key 
figure: the irrational, religious and fanatical ‘suicide bomber.’ As a key signifier of all 
that the free world opposes this figure is now the subject of a whole academic, cum 
therapeutic, industry. The ‘professor of suicide bombing’ doggedly develops policy 
advice about how to prevent and anticipate such attacks. This article rejects social 
scientific explanations of human bombing, interpreting this figure as a social 
symptom of the hegemonic framework for the ordering of life, rather than as an 
irrational outburst against modernity. I argue that the human bomber’s act is a 
symptomatic response to the politicisation of life itself in neoliberal societies. Such an 
analysis restores to human bombings a significance which exceeds the delimitation of 
the act as ‘mad, bad or sad’i in the social scientific literature.1 Explicitly at stake in 
these acts is the value of lives, the means for determining this value, and the meaning 
of value itself. If the human bomber is a figure of fear this article concludes by 
refiguring this fear as the expression of desire, a desire without possible object in the 
current political conjuncture. I begin with a critical analysis of the dominant modes of 
interpretation of suicide bombing. Second, I think these acts as symptomatic 
responses to a particular ordering of lives. I trace the logics of this order through an 
analysis of the form of the act itself. Last, I characterise these acts as forms of acting 
out, that is as symptomatic of the dominant order, rather than as attempts to refigure 
that order.2 
 
1. Explaining ‘Suicide Bombings’ 
 
A young woman walks into a restaurant populated by tourists, many of whom have 
had one drink too many. She eats well. After wiping her mouth, she stands up - 
apparently ready to pay - but then triggers a bomb strapped to her chest. She and a 
number of others are killed. Within minutes news flashes of yet another terrorist 
atrocity dominate the broadcast media. Reporters describe the devastation and quote 
                                                 
1 In this respect at least my analysis is at one with those ‘terrorism experts’ who argue as does 
Neumann, that to understand so called terrorism we must focus on the social and political conditions in 
the global environment, rather than the acts themselves. However, I contend that it is only in analysing 
the form of these acts that we can  begin to explain the phenomenon of suicide bombing. (Neumann 
2009) 
2 One obvious objection to this argument is that it generalises across too many different instances. IN 
my view scholars trained in the abstruse logics of identity politics, and multi-culturalism are far too 
quick to generalise the assumption that each locale has its own rules, structures, cultural identities and 
the like. Of course there is some truth in this. Far more interesting however is the translation in 
particular contexts of those forms of government and rule which have been generalised across the 
globe, and the modulations of these practices in response to resistance and difference.   
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unnamed authorities, who claim that groups allied to Al Qaeda have attacked freedom 
and democracy. A young woman corrupted by radical ideologues has wasted her own 
and other’s lives. Soon the US President, a European statesman or a UN spokesperson 
will blitz the television channels: ‘This is an attack on all freedom loving people. The 
terrorist threat is not going to disappear. We must stand firm against…’ An all too 
familiar story, dressed up in antagonistic tropes: freedom has been dealt a blow by 
fundamentalism; reason has succumbed to irrationality; fundamentalism (coda for 
Islam) has triumphed over democracy.  
 
This re-presentation of the event manages, but also abuses, the trauma. It establishes a 
narrative which fixes the limits of interpretation. The human bomber comes to 
represent, as an over-determined signifier, the antagonistic other, all ‘we’ are fighting, 
a ‘we’ configured through this opposition.ii Two words encapsulate this neat 
distinction: freedom and fundamentalism. No matter what divides ‘us’, ‘we’ share a 
commitment to fighting for freedom against ‘fundamentalism.’ The term evokes a 
series of associations: the fundamentalist insists that there is one truth and one path to 
this truth; (s)he insists that this life is a preparation for the life to come and that 
humankind’s fall from grace necessitates a return to the lost fundamentals; the 
fundamentalist is committed to a greater good. In contrast, liberated individuals 
pursue their own life projects, love and happiness divested of the ‘illusion’ that there 
is one good, and supposedly tolerant of others, and respectful towards difference. The 
representation of bombers in the media maintains the stereotype which links suicide 
bombing to Islam, despite the banal statistical detail demonstrating that such acts are 
committed by men and women from every religion, and in many instances by secular 
political groups. 
 
These antagonistic tropes have found their Lysenkos. A new academic expert, the 
‘Professor of Suicide Bombing’, prowls the halls of academia. S/he draws on 
statistical evidence to demonstrate that religion, poverty, psychopathology, politics - 
or a combination of these factors – explains these acts. The expert then informs policy 
makers how to prevent future atrocities. Most of this social scientific literature shares 
a set of methodological assumptions, even if their conclusions and their uses of the 
evidence differ. First a principle fact or set of facts about the agents are identified. 
Second, these facts are then correlated with incidences of suicide bombing in order to 
explain their occurrence. However, as I now argue, these approaches cannot explain 
human bombings. Instead they serve to validate a particular framing of order, figuring 
these acts in a manner which maintains the status quo.  
 
(a) Religious Fundamentalism 
 
Initially researchers argued that ‘suicide bombings’ are driven by religious (i.e. Islam) 
commitment. These arguments echoed a hegemonic common sense which framed 
them as the acts of radical fundamentalists. Jessica Stern’s text Terror in the Name of 
God purports to explain religious militancy, and why militants kill. She writes:  
 
Religious terrorism arises from pain and loss and from impatience with a God 
who is slow to respond to our plight, who doesn’t answer (Stern 2004, x). 
 
Her methodology is straightforward: ‘I arranged to have locals (sic) administer 
detailed questionnaires, querying the terrorists about their motivations.’ (Stern 2004, 
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xix) Stern demonstrates that suicide bombers are spiritually intoxicated and 
determined to cleanse the world of impurity. This reflects ‘human nature to desire 
transcendence’ (Stern 2004, p.282). The acts are thus in part a response to the God 
shaped hole of modern culture (Stern 2004, p.284) but are also ‘ingeniously cruel’ 
restorative acts, which respond to religious and political humiliation. Recruits are 
promised that their wounded masculinity will be healed. Some suicide bombers ‘take 
pleasure from violence perhaps as a result of a genetic predisposition.’ (Stern 2004, p. 
286)  Stern contends that the Islamic world is particularly vulnerable: ‘Most Muslim-
majority states are corrupt and fragile and unwilling or incapable of providing their 
populations with education, health care and other resources required to create robust 
economies and stable polities.’ (Stern 2004, p.287) Her text finishes with a discussion 
of policy implications. This includes, and again this is all too familiar in this literature, 
an insistence that the US must preserve its special values of tolerance, empathy and 
courage without resorting to tactics which inspire more resistance. Stern’s book, a 
New York Times notable book for 2003, repeats all of the clichés which underpin the 
war on terror: suicide attacks are the result of wounded Islamic masculinity; they are 
supported by a fundamentalist ideology; they ferment in undemocratic Muslim states, 
and may reflect a genetic predisposition to enjoy violence. Leaving aside the racist 
undertones of this particular text there are good reasons for rejecting the argument that 
suicide bombing is driven, in the last instance, by fundamentalist Islam. 
 
First, there is a statistical correlation between ‘religious commitment’ and suicide 
bombing in between 37% and 48% of suicide operations, depending upon how the 
evidence is analysed (Pape 2005, p.17). However, in almost all of these instances the 
organisations responsible, and indeed the bombers, insist upon the political nature of 
their interventions. Since the early 1980s suicide attacks have been carried out by 
Hezbollah in Lebanon, by Al Qaeda globally, by the PKK in “Kurdistan”, by the 
Tamil Tigers (LTTE) in Sri Lanka as well as by a number of smaller organisations.iii 
In most instances the expressed motivations are not religious, but nationalist. Even in 
those cases where religion is very obviously a factor, occupation by foreign powers is 
always invoked as a motivating cause.  
 
Second, Stern’s approach constructs those interviewed as others driven by irrational 
beliefs. She fails to account for the processes of subjectification which results in the 
the bomber’s self perception.iv Stern also limits her study to those explicitly 
committed to fundamentalist Islam determining in advance the answers she will 
outline. 
 
Third, Stern presumes that the best way to gather evidence about ‘suicide bombing’ is 
to interview those who have planned attacks, or who support such attacks. This 
participant observation type approach assumes that the suicide bomber is best placed 
to explain her failed act, and that this may be supplemented by an account of who the 
bomber is (age, ethnicity, religion and the like.) However, the conclusion Stern 
reaches is self selecting (i.e. it is already determined by her selection of who to 
interview.) Moreover she presumes that what is solicited in interview allows the 
interpreter to understand the act. There is, of course, value in seeking to understand 
the motivations of those who deem such acts appropriate. However, it is foolish to 
take at face value what is said, or to assume that explanation stops once the framing of 
the acts by the bombers themselves is shown to be similar. Motivation is not, in and of 
itself, an adequate explanation of a phenomenon. 
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Last, there is one fundamental problem: Stern’s explanation could be deployed to 
explain almost any act of terror. Even were we to accept her quasi-existential account 
of religious longing, wounded masculinity and fundamentalist belief, this could never 
address the form of the act, that is the specificity of a terrorist attack designed to both 
kill and be killed. This is the case for all of the explanatory frameworks explored 
below. The various forms of correlation which supposedly explain suicide bombings 
are no different to other studies of the causes of terrorism: fundamentalism, poverty, 
brain washing, depression and criminality. Each of these supposed explanations seeks 
a correlation between the act and the characteristics common to those who engage in 
the acts. None of these studies address the specificity of ‘suicide bombing’ despite 
claiming to explain the peculiar resurgence of this phenomenon in so called late 
modernity. They explain what might drive an individual to engage in such an act. 
They forget to ask why the act takes this form. 
 
(b) Relative Deprivation 
 
 A second group of scholars argued that ‘suicide bombers’ suffer either relative 
deprivation or extreme poverty. These explanations attribute terrorist activities to 
either real or perceived disadvantage, and assume that disadvantage translates into 
psychological motivation. Again statistics belie this claim. The men and women who 
engage in these acts have come from every social class. In some instances, notably the 
attacks on September the 11th 2001, the people involved had good educations, and 
enjoyed many of the supposed benefits of so called modern societies. There is no 
statistical correlation between economic deprivation and acts of terror (Pape 2004, 
p.18). It is also a mistake to present such correlations as if they could explain 
particular acts. Almost all social scientific approaches accept that social and political 
conditions, perhaps perceived in terms of relative deprivation, have a relation to acts 
of terror or resistance. However, such perceptions cannot be measured, and nor can 
one assume that so called relative deprivation only influences those who fit into the 
statistical categories developed to measure such experiences. Precisely because 
humans are self-interpreting beings, relative deprivation may influence others who do 
not themselves experience deprivation. The important point about the experience of 
deprivation is not its simple existence (this is always relative to other experiences of 
deprivation) but rather how such perceived or real inequalities are politically 
articulated. Expressing surprise at the statistical fact that relative deprivation is a poor 
predictor of the likelihood of any one individual engaging in such an act, misses the 
inter-subjective dimensions delimiting the interpretive horizon within which these acts 
become possible.  
 
(c) Psychopathology 
 
A third set of explanations contends that ‘suicide bombers’ have personality disorders 
or are psychopathic. This literature tends to characterise the human bomber as an 
unemployed social recluse with deep seated psychological problems. However, by 
any measure the individuals involved are fully aware of what they are doing, 
understand the consequences of their actions, and often put their personal affairs in 
order before the event, paying off debts for example. Moreover, such ‘pathological 
personalities’ existed before the last three decades of so called ‘suicide bombing’. 
What requires explanation is not personal psychology but this act. Either way 
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psychological explanations are only ever used to develop technologies of intervention. 
Victoroff (2005) develops an exhaustive summary of these approaches. Whilst critical 
of the use of anecdotal evidence and subjective interpretation in psychological 
approaches, he concludes by describing terrorism generally, and suicide bombing in 
particular, as ‘a variably determined sub-type of human aggression’ (Victoroff 2005, 
p.34). He proposes a unified scientific theory ‘perhaps drawing upon a neuro-
economic model that acknowledges the ultimate adaptive nature of this behaviour, 
modified by an empirically based psychology identifying the influence of individual 
and group dynamics’ (Victoroff 2005, p.35). On this view typical terrorists share four 
common traits: ‘high affective valence regarding an ideological issue’; a personal 
stake in the issue such as perceived oppression; low cognitive flexibility; and last a 
capacity to suppress instinctive or learned moral constraints (Victoroff 2005, pp.35-
36). A supposedly scientific argument states the obvious: ‘terrorists’ are angry about 
an issue and they set aside the moral constraints which prevent others from engaging 
in these acts. This text has two virtues: it presents an exhaustive summary of the 
psychological literature while demonstrating its limits. It then proceeds to use an 
‘empirical psychology’ to reach conclusions which are, at best, conjecture. Victoroff 
acknowledges that far more empirical work to support the psychology of terrorism 
needs to be completed, but his starting assumptions mean that this research is likely to 
confirm what is already obvious. To put this point bluntly, Victoroff and writers of his 
ilk explain the psychological state of those already engaged in such acts. He cannot 
begin to understand why the act takes this particular form, and why these forms of 
terror have become so prevalent.  
 
 
(d) Rational Political Choice 
 
‘Suicide bombing2 is now routinely explained in political terms, as a rational and 
strategic instrument for groups engaged in asymmetrical struggles. A key text in this 
literature is Robert Pape’s Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. 
Pape argues persuasively that these activities are chosen by political organisations for 
their strategic superiority over other possible acts. They are rational choices in 
situations where there are few alternatives. He demonstrates that the explicit 
motivation for such attacks is the demand for occupied land to be returned, and for 
national political self determination. Pape also notes both the historical specificity of 
the wave of suicide bombings which began in the early 1980s, and the range of 
organisations prepared to use this form of attack. He argues that religious, 
psychological and economic explanations for such acts are flawed. Instead, the 
empirical evidence points to the opposite conclusion: individuals who carry out these 
acts are psychologically ‘normal’, often have good economic prospects, and are well 
integrated into their own communities. He writes: 
 
Most suicide terrorism is undertaken as a strategic effort directed toward 
particular political goals; it is not simply the product of irrational individuals or 
an expression of fanatical hatreds. The main purpose of suicide terrorism is to 
use the threat of punishment to compel a target government to change policy, 
and most especially to cause democratic states to withdraw forces from land the 
terrorists perceive as their national homeland (Pape 2005, p.27). 
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Here Pape make clear his methodological commitments. He views these acts as 
rational choices in the circumstances, and he deploys empirical evidence, 
demonstrating statistical correlations, to support this view. His wide ranging text 
draws on evidence from attacks across the world. He, like Hafez writing in 2006, 
analyses these acts from three points of view, first, the individual suicide bomber, 
second the political organisation(s) claiming responsibilty and last the communities 
who lend support to such acts. This allows Pape to emphasise both the altruistic 
dimensions of these acts, as well as the strategic decision making which informs 
organisational logics. Hafez (2006), likewise, in his text Manufacturing Human 
Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers draws on 12 years of empirical 
research to demonstrate that the motivations of individuals differ from those of 
groups, (the first relating to personal aspirations for martyrdom, the second to the 
strategic objectives of the organisation) while societal motivations have to do with 
levels of perceived and real oppression.  
 
Pape’s text is refreshingly free of judgment, even if he finishes with the all too 
familiar account of policy implications. His work, along with that of Bloom (2005) 
and Gambeta (2005), confirms that asymmetries in power, religious difference, 
foreign occupations and political oppression are the key explanatory factors.  These 
texts are all committed to the view that suicide bombings are ‘strategic [acts] whose 
behaviour is not only intelligible but amenable to rational analysis.’ (Euben 2007, 
p.129).  
 
There are however profound limitations with these approaches. Pape never reflects on 
the unique nature of human bombs, nor does he explain their prevalence during the 
period which he studies. His account might just as well explain the acts of anti-
colonial movements in the second half of the 20th century. He relies on an ideal of 
scientific neutrality, driven by a methodological commitment to ascertaining the 
relevant facts about bombers. He assumes that the use of the widest possible data set, 
combined with no ideological commitments, and a commitment to determining the 
rationality of the act, will deliver the best possible explanation. As in the other 
examples mentioned above Pape takes the idea of what a fact is for granted, and he 
assumes that acts have a causal explanation which may be statistically inferred once 
the correct evidence has been gathered. Pape’s text betrays itself in not explaining 
what it sets out to explain. He cannot explain ‘human bombing’ or suicide bombing. 
Instead he has shown that there is a certain strategic sense in these acts, that they are 
responses to foreign occupation, and that they often result in political success. Why 
though have these acts of terror become so prevalent since the early 1980s? Why does 
the media focus on these acts, given that there are so many more acts of terror which 
do not involve suicide?   
 
(e) Limitations of the Political Science of ‘Suicide Bombing’ 
 
What unites these explanations? First, they all find their rationale within an accepted 
framing of order. They assume that the acts can be remedied once the causal factors 
which resulted in the acts have been determined. Second, in assuming a direct causal 
link between social facts and psychological motivation, they fail to account for the 
peculiarity of the act itself. Indeed, no purported explanation of these acts addresses 
the particular form that the acts assume. These explanations might just as well be 
deployed in the context of Northern Ireland, or to explain Basque separatist terror. 
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Third, these explanations presume the neutrality of the facts ascertained, or, presume a 
standard of rationality which can be deployed regardless of context or social structure. 
Thus, the rational choice variants of these arguments suggest that suicide bombers aim 
to maximise their perceived interests. Religious motifs are recast as instrumental 
actions. These are all versions of a scientism which claims to explain motivation 
(rational given the circumstances or beliefs), cause (experience of deprivation whether 
existential or material) and cure (therapy in all of its variants). The political science of 
suicide bombing seeks, as Charles Taylor once noted in relation to voting behaviour, 
to ascertain the brute data beyond interpretive dispute. It treats meaningful actions as 
facts about the agent. Political science underemphasises the relation of the act to the 
structures and institutions which delimit the act, the symbolic order against which the 
interpretation of the act must be judged, and the particular ordering of life against 
which bombers react. (Taylor, 1971) 
 
These writers thus ignore the possibility that these acts, as awful as they are, challenge 
fundamental precepts about the dominant global ordering of life and life chances. The 
proposed solutions are already the practices that govern the social logics which give 
rise to martyrdom operations. These analyses are not ideological misrepresentations. 
Rather, they represent a dominant worldview committed to secular reason, the 
celebration of freedom and individual innovation, the extension of both quality of life 
and length of life.  
 
There are then a number of questions which this literature cannot answer. First, why 
use the body as a weapon, even in cases where other strategies are possible? Second, 
why is it that the figure of the human bomber occupies a dominant place in the social 
imaginary? What is at stake in these acts, regardless of their provenance, is the body 
and its relation to the polity, yet this is precisely what most explanations cannot 
address. Why has life itself been politicised such that these acts come to figure our 
present? How is the body, when used as a weapon designed to take the lives of others, 
related to the body politic? Why is this link between mortality and politics forced 
upon us? Why does this figure exercise such a fascination for the gaze of the media? 
Why, in spite of constant interpretation and reinterpretation, does suicide bombing not 
dissolve itself? Why does it persist?v In what follows I argue that these acts are 
anticipated by the dominant global order, that this ordering foreclosesvi other acts, and 
that as symptoms of this order they cast a dire light on its logics. This obscene 
supplement to the dominant ordering of our worlds illuminates its logics.vii   
 
2. Suicide Bombing as Social Symptom 
 
 
In his influential text Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century 
Phillip Bobbit writes:  
 
‘In each era terrorism derives its ideology in reaction to the raison d’être of the 
dominant constitutional order, at the same time negating and rejecting that 
form’s unique ideology but mimicking the form’s structural characteristics.’ 
(Bobbit 2008, p.26)  
 
Bobbit historicises this claim, contending that terrorism has always been a symptom 
of changes in the constitutional order of states.  It exists as an ‘…epiphenomenon of 
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the constitutional order.’ (25) He understands this order in terms of the configuration 
and organisation of both material and symbolic power. While ‘terrorists’ reject the 
explicit ideology of a dominant order, they mimic the dominant form’s structural 
characteristics. In Bobbit’s view we live during a phase of transition, and the 
emergent form is the networked market state. The market state divests itself of social 
responsibilities, sets the rules of a networked polity, incentivises individuals and 
private organisations and increasingly does not provide welfare on the model of the 
social democratic state. The key activity of the market state during a period of 
transition from the industrial and welfare nation state systems of the 20th century, is 
deregulation not only of the economy, but also of reproductive laws, of genetic 
manipulation and of human rights. Rights, he argues, will now become variegated, 
awarded differentially rather than universally. In a similar vein services such as 
education, welfare provision, health and criminality will be disaggregated into their 
component parts and franchised out to the cheapest suppliers. Thus, to take a recent 
example, the 2011 white paper on higher education in the United Kingdom proposes 
the disaggregation of degree awarding powers (reserved for Universities), from the 
teaching of degrees and the provision of services required at an educational 
institutional, which may both be tendered out to the cheapest provider. The state’s 
sole role on this view is to regulate provision, managing the accounting systems 
required to maintain accountability. Accountability in these systems is rewritten 
according to the rules of accounting and actuarial calculative logics. On Bobbit’s 
account the suicide bomber is an ‘ideal weapon for the outsourcing market state 
terrorist network... All the network advantages of redundancy, interoperability, 
diversity and decentralised command and control are maximised by the outsourced 
suicide bomber.’ (Bobbit, p.53) On Bobbit’s account Al Quaeda mimics the market 
state, outsourcing terror, refusing centralised command structures, and claiming credit 
for actions by groups only distantly related.  
 
Bobbit directs us to the structural features of the increasingly globalised market state 
He views terrorism as a symptomatic response to this order. However, he fails to 
elucidate what he means by a symptom, and gives no indication as to how a symptom 
might be produced. Moreover, he overemphasises the structural features of the market 
state, with little discussion of the material reconfiguration of human life which such a 
neo-liberal polity requires. I concur with Bobbit’s intuition that the ‘terrorist’ act is 
symptomatic of a particular constitutional order. He establishes the starting points: the 
form that the act takes mirrors that of the constitutional order and mimics its logics but 
in a distorted form. Here Bobbit approaches Freud’s description of the symptom as a 
distorted response to perceived danger, and as the expression of a drive which cannot 
find direct expression as a consequence of repression. However, for Freud symptoms 
are psychosomatic expressions of repression often experienced as pain. The somatic 
and affective dimensions of aspects the symptom are the starting point for its 
interpretation. 
 
A symptomatic account reads suicide bombing as an acting outviii which renders 
visible the failure of the universalism promoted by this order. Symptoms, as signifiers 
of underlying complexes, point in allusive manner towards these complexes and their 
limits. This interpretive work asks why this particular act is chosen by so many, and 
why now? Why are these acts then re-presented by media outlets and governments, as 
the signifier of opposition to the ‘West’. Here the concern is not with the content of 
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the bomber’s declarations, nor with the causal models developed to explain the act. 
Rather, as Zizek writes:  
 
‘The point is to avoid the properly fetishistic fascination of the ‘content’ 
supposedly hidden behind the form: the ‘secret’ to be unveiled through 
analysis is not the content hidden by the form…but on the contrary ‘the secret 
of this form itself.’’ix  
 
Zizek is of course echoing Marx’s account of the fetishism of commodities in the first 
volume of Das Kapital. If the ‘symptom is strictly speaking a particular element 
which subverts its own universal foundation’ (Zizek 1989) in what sense does the 
suicide bomber subvert a dominant universalism in driving its logic to its most 
extreme point, unwittingly exposing the force underpinning that order. The sacrificex 
of the body and the killing of others as a symptom is ‘a pathological signifying 
formation…resisting communication and interpretation which cannot be included in 
the circuit of discourse’ but which is at the same time a positive condition of that 
order (Zizek 1989, p.74).xi As an act that brings communication to a halt, refusing the 
terms of communication structuring our world, the suicide bomber nonetheless enacts 
the perverse underside of this dominant order. The symptom, then, is a compromise 
formation. It allows for the expression of the drive in an indirect manner. 
 
While these acts puncture the dominant universalism, they do so only by acting out 
the logic of that order. It is only if situated in relation to the practices which constitute 
the logics of this order, that the acting out of the human bomber may be understood. 
Conventional explanations of suicide bombing are blind to this order, to the ways in 
which that order is naturalised and its history forgotten.xii In what follows I interpret: 
first the use of the body as a weapon; second, the embodied relations with others laid 
claim to in the act; third the horror of the act, and fourth the promise of the act, the 
politics it alludes to but cannot claim. I interpret suicide bombing as an over-
determined complex which alludes to the underside of the neo-liberal capture of life. 
In other words, I take Bobitt’s claims at face value: a dominant constitutional order 
itself structures the terms of terrorist response, particularly in the form of the act. 
Interpreting suicide bombing along these lines casts a harsh light on that order, but it 
also pushes beyond Bobbit’s analysis of the constitutional order, to focus on the 
ordering of life.  
 
 
(a) Bodies that matter 
 
The least disputable ‘fact’ about human bombing is that the body is quite literally at 
stake. A human being attaches a bomb, normally prepared by others, to her own body. 
S/he enters a public place where others, not directly complicit in acts of oppression, 
though often indirectly implicated in these acts, have gathered. No warning is issued. 
The bomber targets as many people as possible, treating their bodies and their lives as 
dispensable. He aims to create a spectacle, a media event which no one can ignore, an 
event designed to ignite passions. The body of the bomber is invariably torn to shreds, 
as are those of others close by.xiii The bomber treats the victims’ bodies and their lives 
as dispensable. It is as if the body of the bomber is no longer their own, as if in order 
to reclaim personhood the body has to be given up. The suicide bomber quite literally 
instrumentalises her body, and those of others. Fanon, in his Wretched of the Earth 
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argues that in the colonial situation violence becomes an end in itself. For Fanon the 
psychological liberation which goes hand in hand with a process of social liberation 
requires violence not as its means, but as intrinsic to achieving liberation, a means of 
subjectification for those rendered inert by the colonial order. However, Fanon cannot 
maintain the line between violence as instrumental, and violence as an end in itself, 
without severe difficulty (Fanon 2001, pp. 73-74). The suicide bomber dissolves this 
distinction altogether. This is one reason why rational choice theorists cannot explain 
‘suicide bombing’. The bomber makes certain that their flesh has a value, precisely at 
the moment when they can no longer experience that value.  
 
The sacrifice of the body is, I contend, a rejection of the almost complete absorption 
of all bodies into a particular ordering of bodies in neo-liberal polities. What is at 
stake is how each body is accounted for, accorded value, and disciplined. The body of 
the suicide bomber, his own and yet not his own, disciplined and ordered yet not in 
his control, identified with an ideology that lays claim to it for political purposes, 
echoes, I contend, the discipline and ordering of all bodies in space and in time in a 
globalised economy and polity. Yet this takes to an unthinkable extreme the ordering 
of the body, an extreme beyond the bounds of common sense, yet at the same time an 
explicit echo of that common sense.  
 
Foucault in his late lectures on bio-politics identified the forms that modern power 
takes in relation to the subjects of this power. His account is all too familiar to anyone 
living in contemporary democracies: control is exercised over individuals through 
debt; subjects are encouraged to view themselves as personal capital, and are 
evaluated as embodied capital through the various technologies invoked to determine 
the requisite value of each individual; each subject is viewed, and comes to view 
himself, as an investment opportunity; those who work can purchase their own futures 
by taking out debts which discipline their actions in the future; citizens in democracies 
own mortgaged properties, and thus mortgage their own time, labour and life.  
 
The two sides of the dominant subjectivity thus emerge: a commitment to the 
liberation of self from all constraints which requires a constant monitoring of the self 
against risks now individualised, rather than collectivised. This is a project which is 
not simply about the extension of the free market in goods and commodities, as 
certain Marxist critics suggest; it is not simply about the predominance of finance 
capital over manufacturing or industrial capital as writers influenced by Hilferdung’s 
account of imperialism suggest. Rather, it concerns the capitalisation of life itself.  
 
The neo-liberalism of the first decades of the 21st century then is not simply the 
reframing of older discursive practises. The key determinants of the hegemonic neo-
liberalism of today concerns three issues: first, an ideological and fantasmatic 
commitment to the rationality of the market, and the self interest of individuals; 
second, the extension of actuarial forms of valuation to all areas of life, and the 
concomitant marketisation of all human relationships; and third, the extension of 
information technologies as a means of exercising control over the distribution of 
bodies in space and in time, and as a means of valuing all bodies, against the same 
calculus. This has been termed the financialisation of everyday life, but I prefer the 
phrase actuarial politics, a politics which like the insurance technologies of old 
depends upon the valuing of subjects as embodied in a variety of social relationships, 
all of which are monetised. Each of these determinants has its underside: self 
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interested individuals undermine the implicit moral framework required to maintain a 
balanced market; information technologies once actuarialised rationalise 
discrimination against those who score badly against the calculus, raising disturbing 
ethical questions about the very basis of human life lived in common; last these new 
practices require appropriate forms of legal ownership and control, most notably the 
ability to patent information which allows for the exercise of economic and political 
control from afar, through the outsourcing of labour and service activities. This order 
distributes possible relations between bodies and subjects in an apparently neutral 
calculus. What is at stake is each body as a bearer of messages, the body as engraved 
with different signs and values, signs which distribute different forms of property in 
this body.  
 
The human bomber represents back to us this almost universal power exerted 
indirectly over bodies and the subjects of those bodies, a power which is increasingly 
all encompassing as the same technologies – both of the self, and of the administration 
of everyday life – extend to every corner of the planet. The bomber uses his body as a 
weapon. This exercise of absolute control over the self by the self is an almost exact 
figuration of the ideal self of neo-liberal societies: the individual who takes charge of 
their own life, makes their own decisions unfettered by the constraints of taxation and 
regulation, the individual whose morality consists in securing life for himself, and in 
so doing not becoming a burden on others. This version of homo oeconomicus is more 
a cultural ideal than a reality, but it is the form of subjectiviation characteristic of 
contemporary capitalism.  
 
This combination of freedom and of risk is enacted, although perversely so, in using 
one’s body as a weapon. The perverse twist is important here: the individual takes 
charge of his own life in the most extreme form, to the point where she no longer has 
any control over that life. This giving up of all control over the self is however the 
other side of an order which preaches self-liberation and yet requires an absolute 
enclosure in webs of debt, property, work, and inequality which orders the differences 
between lives lived in freedom. The suicide bomber performs the complete liberation 
of the body which the neo-liberal order claims to encourage.  
 
(b) Purchasing the Future 
 
The human bomber invests his life in the future. Likewise, the dominant financial 
instruments  of our time purchase the future: investment in life is determined by the 
possibility of a long term return, a calculation which already shapes that future, 
seeking to protect the future from the contingency of the incalculable event. This 
colonization of possibility as a calculable asset forecloses the possibility of a future 
which may be other, as we have already committed our selves to a particular image of 
what the future must be. This in part explains the growth of what can only be termed 
the fantastical politics of the event, as proposed by Badiou and Zizek, a commitment 
to the incalculable event which sets new coordinates as yet unrecognized. The act of 
the suicide bomber mimics precisely this form of ordering life through debt. The 
bomber performs an incalculable act, one which exceeds all ordering of this life, but 
in doing so s/he closes off any possible future, taking others with her. The suicide 
bomber once again takes to its extreme this logic of investment in future. If the broker 
makes a calculation apparently guaranteed to secure a return, the suicide bomber 
engages in an act in which the return is guaranteed for a future which cannot be 
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calculated at all. In so doing the act of suicide bombing enact a different form of 
valuing human life. Whether impelled by secular or religious commitments what the 
suicide bomber suggests is that the value of any one life cannot be calculated, that a 
value reduced to the abstract horror of number is no value whatsoever. The perverse 
desire to kill as many heathens, or Americans, or colonisers as is possible enacts this 
commitment to a numerical determination of value, even as it depends upon the 
presentation of the bomber as having a unique value, as one who cannot merely be 
counted, but whose life has a value beyond the count.  
 
(c) Equality of the Flesh 
 
I have already indicated that these acts stand in for the enclosure of individual bodies 
within technologies which both map and make the subject. Human bombings are also 
inter-subjective acts. In Mass Psychology Freud contends that: ‘the individual from 
the beginning of his or her life is invariably linked to somebody else as a model, as an 
object, as a helper, as an opponent…from the very first individual psychology is 
social psychology as well.’ (Freud 1985: p.158) He contends that the individual mind 
is thus a group mind, and that the distinction between self and other is far more 
difficult to maintain than is commonly presupposed. This helps on the one hand to 
explain the radical destitution of self that occurs when objects of libidinal investment 
are lost- as in love- but it has implications for any conception of politics: a decisive 
rejection of liberal conceptions of the rational self, but also a warning about the 
consequences of what it means to be a human animal- the fragility of identity, the 
dangers and the promise of this necessary imbrication of the self in the other.  
 
Engaged in an inter-subjective act the human bomber makes two claims: first, he 
enacts an equality of bodies. Equality in death is enacted, in a grotesquery that mocks 
equality. The flesh of your body is of no more value than is mine, she claims. This 
perverse claim to equality is also an existential protest against what existence has 
become. The bomber lays claim to another life, a life beyond his reach, but in so 
doing passes comment on this life, where equality is daily betrayed. Of course the 
equality laid claim to is not one that we would recognise. Of course the act violates 
any sensible understanding of what equality might be. However, at the literal level of 
the body, what is enacted is an equality of flesh reduced to a zero point, where finally 
no flesh has any value, and become merely meat.  
 
Second, the suicide bomber puts into in to question how we live together. The bomber 
will have no life of their own to come, and will take the potential futures of others in 
his ghastly act. There is however a ghostly echo of the manner in which contemporary 
societies are organised around the purchasing of the future, a future which is costed, 
and then loaned out so that the subject must act out the future which they have 
purchased. A global order structured around logics of debt instils in its subjects an 
ethos of behaviour rather than action. In this sense the financialised subject is more 
like a zombie than a human. The term zombie originated in the Niger delta region. 
Zombies were animated corpses, who labored for an unseen God, but were incapable 
of acting for themselves. The suicide bomber’s act refuses the zombification offered 
up by consumer culture, seeks to wake the living dead from their mortificaction, but 
offers nothing in return. We must be precise here: this is not in any direct sense the 
reason for the act carried out. One could not trace a causal link, in the sense in which 
an empirical study might, between perceptions of consumerism say and a desire to 
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take the lives of others. Rather, the act is situated within the overdetermined complex 
within which we find its significance.  
 
(d) Asymmetrical Warfare 
 
When kamikaze pilots attacked American ships towards the end of World War two, 
they did so as soldiers defending their nation. Whatever the wrongs of the imagined 
community their actions were against other soldiers, themselves engaged in war, and 
prepared to kill or be killed. Acts of suicide terror target unknowing civilians. 
Caverero’s text Horrorism highlights this.  As she notes what is regarded as most 
awful is the ‘scandal [of] the aberrant self annihilating will of the perpetrator, despite 
the fact that the slaughter of the innocent is starting to appear normal.’ (Caverero 
2009, 92). The apparent disregard for this life stokes the imaginary antagonism which 
drives the war on terror, but why, Caverero asks, the focus on the perpetrator rather 
than the victim? Certainly the media drives this perverse fascination, but there is more 
to this fascination than the mediatised image of the fundamentalist driven to commit 
suicide and homicide simultaneously. Certainly this spectacle disciplines, requiring 
subjects ever vigilant to the potential dangers which may lurk on trains, planes and 
automobiles.xiv 
 
More interesting though is to set this suicidal homicide against the particular form that 
war has taken since Desert Storm. Caverero notes the technologisation of war, which 
has sought to write the body of the soldier out of battle altogether, epitimosed in 
particular by stealth bombers which target ‘terrorists’without any risk to those who 
control the bomber. This contrasts with the explicit use of the body as a weapon. 
Rather than hiding behind technologies of destruction which dull the watching eye 
into the illusion of participating in a video game without victims, the suicide bomber’s 
act testifies to the horror of war in refusing to shy away from the wanton destruction 
such weapons wreak. This is testimony to the attempt of warring powers to magically 
transmogrify war into a bloodless event, rendered free of cumbersome bodies all of 
whom have identities, communities and families. This asymmetry echoes others, more 
obvious and enduring: the technologies available for waging war are deployed in 
defence of the asymmetries which structure the relations between states, as well as the 
asymmetries which protect small elites within states. These acts are a form of 
feedback, insofar as they signal back to the system a certain truth about itself.  
 
(e) The Value of Life 
 
What unites these formal aspects of the act is a question which any human asks: what 
is the value of my life. The neo-liberal ordering of contemporary life answers this 
question in actuarial rather than metaphysical terms. This complex, often contested, 
though almost everywhere hegemonic mode of subjectification maintains the 
possibility of surplus consumption for some. However it is quite literally the 
consumption of other lives. In this sense Marx was correct in Das Kapital when 
writing that ‘...dead labor vampire-like, only lives by sucking living labor, and lives 
the more, the more labor it sucks…’ (Marx Volume I, Chapter 10, Section 1, p. 257.)  
 
This order also distributes value in death. Increased life expectancy in the West, the 
creation of conditions under which citizens are increasingly ‘incapable of the 
experience of death’ (Daub. 2006, p.151) is mirrored by a fall in average life 
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expectancy in many postcolonial societies as poverty, disease and famine destroyed 
the lives of millions, as the international economy is restructured as informational and 
service oriented, and as excess consumption by the wealthy mirrors debt, poverty and 
war economies for others. Montag terms this necro-economics, or market death. Or, 
as Mbembe writes: 
 
In the colonial situation sovereignty means the right to define who matters and 
who does not; who is disposable and who is not. This combines three distinct 
operations of power: necro-politics, disciplinary control, and a bio-politics. 
(Mbembe 2002: 20) 
 
This is an inclusive exclusion of life, a calculus determining which lives are worth 
enclosing, how best to do so in each case, and which lives should be excluded or kept 
at a polite distance, a distance which is in fact infinite. The suicide bomber parodies 
precisely this strange world in which some have become incapable of the experience 
of death, while others live with death, are allowed to die, have become disposable. 
The bomber quite literally disposes of lives as if they have no value, but this disposing 
mirrors the daily disposal of lives, not in the manner of a direct killing, but at a 
distance so that responsibility might be denied, or indeed impossible to trace. The 
disruption of the management of death at a distance, situates death in the immediacy 
of empire, as a spectacle to be devoured by those kept at arm’s length, but also as a 
shock which reinforces the dominant logics.  
 
 
3. The Promise of the act 
 
I have used the terms acting out, as opposed to act, in the account above. This 
suggests a distinction between an authentic act, as opposed to an act somehow 
inauthentic. I am prepared to hold on to this distinction, and use it as the basis for a 
critique of these acts. As a symptom of an underlying complex the suicide bomber 
mimics that order, but in distorted form. Symptomatic acting out derives its structural 
logic from precisely the order which it claims to oppose, in this case the globalised 
market state. However, symptoms, as awful as they may be, are also indicative of a 
resistance to the constraints through which they are produced. They are an attempt to 
present what cannot be presented. Such acting out however misses its target. In that 
precise sense it is metonymical, it echoes dominant orders but does not reorder them; 
it proposes an alternative politics, but it is a politics already fostered by that order. 
Suicide bombing, as a symptom, displaces any coherent response to a particular 
ordering of the body in that it cannot confront that order head on, in part because its 
diagnosis of that order is incoherent.  
 
This displacement occurs in two respects: first the method of attack avoids a 
confrontation with fundamental claims of that order while acting out its imperatives. 
The evangelical commitment to the extension of freedom is linked, not coincidentally, 
to a quasi-religious Christian fundamentalism which subtends to the evangelical 
hinterland of the war on terror. The fundamentalism of groups such as Al Quaeda 
does little more than return this message in distorted form. Second, the targeting of 
other lives echoes what that order already authorises, through the legitimation of acts 
of violence that allow some to die while privileging certain lives over others. To put 
this plainly, the suicide bomber reacts against a particular order that is now 
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hegemonic in most areas of the world. Instead of addressing that hegemonic ordering 
of the social world and positing feasible alternatives, the suicide bomber acts out a 
response which is not in fact an act against that order. Instead the act affirms, both in 
terms of form, and in the response it evokes, precisely the form of that order. 
However, we should not miss the claim which is made in the act. As perverse as it 
may seem the act of the bomber enacts an equality of flesh, a flesh rendered 
meaningless meat. This enactment reacts against the abstract violences of both 
asymmetrical wars, and actuarial forms of counting, which determine the value of 
lives in monetary terms.  
 
A properly political act by contrast targets the contours of the dominant framing of 
order. Suicide bombing as a symptom displaces a coherent response to a particular 
ordering of the body in that it cannot confront that order head on, in part because its 
diagnosis of that order is incoherent. One does not have to identify with the methods 
of the jihadists, to recognise that this is a war driven by a rejection of the terms on 
which freedom has been implemented, a reaction to conditions of profound inequality 
which this freedom protects. In this sense, and in this sense alone, a commitment to 
equality recognises the symptomal torsion condensed in the bodies of those for whom 
this life is no longer worth living. A commitment to equality refuses the explicit 
commitments to inequality which many of these groups espouse, and the implicit 
commitment to inequality which is what the war on terror protects. It thus rewrites 
this set of antagonisms on terms unrecognisable within that binary horizon. 
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i I use the shorthand ‘mad, bad, sad’ to denote the key terms on which suicide bombing has been 
analysed: mad, refers to the psychologisation of bombers as psychotic depressives; bad refers to the 
criminalisation of bombers, refusing any political status to the acts, and sad refers to the economic 
arguments which circulate around the term relative deprivation. 
ii Alain Badiou has noted that this figure (specifically in relation to the 9/11 attacks) determines a 
subject (the West, democracies, us), a predicate (Islamic terrorism) and a sequence (the war against 
terror.) This has three related effects a subject effect, an alterity effect and a periodisation- effect.  
iii For a discussion of the statistics see Pape, Dying to Win, p. 40. 
iv It is a fashionable cliché that participant observation is more likely to deliver evidence which better 
reflects the interests or motivations of a group. Stern obviously could not do this, so she opts for 
interviews carried out by locals, but then takes this ‘evidence’ at face value. The interview becomes the 
indirect route to garnering social facts.  
v I am parodying a similar question posed by Zizek in The Sublime Object of Ideology. He is drawing 
directly on Lacan’s account of interpretation of the symptom here.  
vi I use this term foreclosure in a precise sense: in psychoanalysis foreclosure refers to signifiers which 
cannot be integrated within a particular symbolic framework.  
vii Slavoj Zizek first uses this term in How to Read Lacan. He writes: This, of course, brings us back to 
the opposition between Ego-Ideal and obscene superego: at the level of Ego-Ideal (which here equals 
the public symbolic law: the set of rules we are supposed to follow in our public speech), nothing 
problematic happens, the text is clean, while, at another level, the text bombards the spectator with the 
superego injunction "Enjoy!", i.e. give way to your dirty imagination…This double reading is not 
simply a compromise on the part of the symbolic law, in the sense that the law is interested only in 
keeping up appearances, and leaves you free your exercise of dirty imagination on condition that it 
does not encroach upon the public domain. The law itself needs its obscene supplement, it is sustained 
by it.’ (2006) The crucial point here is that the Symbolic domain requires for its functioning an 
imaginary supplement, one which is acceptable as long as it does not encroach on the public domain. I 
want to go one step further and suggest that the neo liberal ordering of life requires precisely this 
transgression which is demanded by a symbolic law which says not just enjoy, but value, make certain 
your life has value.  
viii I will distinguish between acting out, and an act. The former confirms the social logics which it 
appears to oppose; the latter takes on the very logic of that order, rather than acting out its imperatives. 
One of the questions we will have to consider is the extent to which this order forecloses the possibility 
of acts which reject its logics.  
ix Zizek (ibid): p.11. 
x Again, we should be precise when using this overdetermined word sacrifice. It means, very simply, 
the performance of sacred rites. In what sense is the human bomber performing a sacred rite? Most 
explanations immediately revert to religious stereotyping. However, more important is that a rite 
follows prescribed rules, and does not question the logic of those rules. Moreover, what is important is 
the sacred status of those rules. Sacred rules are not themselves subject to any higher power, precisely 
because in earthly terms they are at the source of that power. Here we touch on the relationship 
between sovereign power and life analysed most convincingly in Agamben’s Homo Sacer. 
xi We can go down this route only so far though. While Zizek avoids such banal generalisations there 
are Lacanian theorists who would argue, as does Stavrakakis for example, that aggression is the 
projection outward of an impossibility which cannot be fulfilled. Thus the fundamental deadlock of the 
real is projected on to an other as the reason for my failure to achieve plenitude. The Bosnian war is 
thus reduced to a misrecognition of this fundamental deadlock. All analysis here grinds to a halt, in the 
stupid assertion that in the final instance a democratic ethos recognises this lack in the self which no 
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antagonism toward the other can ever resolve. One can see how this could play out in relation to the 
interpretation of suicide bombing without thinking at all.  
xii I implicitly draw upon Adorno’s analysis of the relation between nature and history in his early text 
The idea of natural history here. (1932) 
xiii Adriano Cavarero addresses the horror that is central to these bombings. Her text Horrorism 
analyses the preponderance of violence against helpless victims, of which suicide bombing is but one 
example. 
xiv Jackson (2005) develops a sustained critique of the language of the ‘war on terror’, demonstrating 
the rhetorical tropes deployed in the shaping of a public consensus around the need to foreign 
interventions, the justification for the violation of the central tenets of liberal democratic rights, and the 
extension of the political hegemony of the military industrial complex. However, he at no point 
analyses the figure of the suicide bomber as a nodal point within this discursive practice. 
